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A Survey of the Economic Systems of 
Wild Chimpanzees and Baboons 
Frederic L. Pryor 
In what ways are humans different from other animals? Various pro- 
posed indicators of the qualitative differences have fallen one by one as 
research in animal behavior has shown that nonhuman primates make 
and/or use tools, weapons, symbols, and other alleged accouterments of 
civilization. But even if we are unable rigorously to specify important 
qualitative differences between us and our closest animal relations, suffi- 
cient quantitative differences exist that it is worthwhile to investigate these 
phenomena along various dimensions, especially if we wish to understand 
something of the evolutionary journey that the human economy has taken. 
The major purpose of this essay is to survey the economic systems of 
wild chimpanzees and baboons, primates featuring some marked differ- 
ences in their social and economic life. Some pertinent comparisons of 
particular aspects of these economies will also be made regarding certain 
features of the economies of tribal peoples in order to gain perspective on 
human evolution. 
Several limitations of this essay must be explicitly noted. First, the 
focus is primarily on observable similarities and differences of behavior, 
rather than on a general theory of ape and monkey psychology or 
decision-making mechanisms. Second, the discussion of empirical mate- 
rials is limited to a cross-section analysis of different primate economies; 
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it does not review the voluminous and confusing literature on the exact 
evolutionary path that has been taken. 
The essay begins by specifying certain social and structural character- 
istics of these nonhuman primate societies. It then surveys materials from 
field studies concerning their economic systems by focusing on their pro- 
duction, distribution, and consumption activities. On the basis of this evi- 
dence, certain broader aspects of their-and our-economic systems are 
analyzed. 
The Context of the Economic System 
Biology and Geography 
Chimpanzees belong to the great ape family, to the genus Pan troglo- 
dytes. Taxonomists differ on the specification of the various species, but 
with the exception of the pygmy chimpanzee (not considered in this dis- 
cussion), the differences are small. They live in the wild only in sub- 
Saharan Africa, from Sierra Leone in the west across the Congo basin to 
Tanzania and Uganda in the east. 
Baboons are old world monkeys of the Cercopithecidae family and 
genus Papio. Taxonomists also differ on the specification of the various 
species. Here, the focus is on only two types: the savanna baboon (which 
includes four subspecies) and the hamadryas baboon (sometimes called 
the desert or sacred baboon). Both types live in the wild over a broad 
area in sub-Saharan Africa and the tip of the Arabian peninsula. 
The baboons have smaller brain sizes than the chimpanzees; when 
given problem solving tests allegedly measuring intelligence, they score 
lower [Rumbaugh and Gill 1973]. These tests, however, may not measure 
all relevant orders of intelligence. 
Behavior and Environment 
Because of the extreme adaptability of apes and monkeys, their be- 
havior varies considerably in different environments. In captivity they 
may engage in certain sexual practices that have seldom if ever been ob- 
served in their native habitat. Chimpanzee behavior in laboratories can 
be remarkable: They have been taught certain symbols and have used 
these to obtain food; they also have been taught about money and may 
hoard the chips and take them from other chimpanzees by making 
threats.' Studies of such behavior in captivity may not show much about 
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activities in the wild, but they teach a great deal about behavioral poten- 
tial [Kummer and Kurt 1965; Beck 1974]. 
Human interaction with primates in the wild also seems to modify their 
behavior. For all three groups considered here, there is evidence that pro- 
visioning (laying out food for them) evokes more aggressive behavior 
than is usual.2 
It should be added that in the wild many characteristics of social or- 
ganization also appear to be influenced by environmental conditions such 
as the size, clustering, and composition of the foraging bands of savanna 
baboons; employment of certain technologies; and diet. Although prima- 
tologists have made considerable headway in exploring such relationships 
[Altmann 1972; Eisenberg 1972; and Teleki 1977], much theoretical and 
empirical work still needs to be done before the underlying mechanisms 
can be fully understood. 
The discussion below focuses only upon chimpanzees and baboons in 
their native habitats and relatively undisturbed by humans. The advis- 
ability of this limitation must be left to the judgment of the reader. 
Social Organization 
Of the nonhuman primates considered here, chimpanzees are the most 
"individualistic," using this word in a loose sense (and implying nothing 
about their personality). More specifically, they live in the forest in re- 
gional communities of roughly 30 to 80, but coordinated activity of the 
communities as a whole is relatively unimportant (even though coordina- 
tion of subgroup activity occurs).3 Although members of the troop recog- 
nize each other and interact in a variety of ways in which they do not be- 
have with nonmembers, these communities are apparently permeable to 
emigre chimpanzees (long-term census data are just beginning to be col- 
lected, for example [Teleki et al. 1976]). Chimpanzees travel in foraging 
groups of varying numbers, often very much smaller than the commu- 
nities. The group may consist of a solitary chimpanzee, a mother and her 
infants or adolescent children, several adult males, or a mixture of these 
[Goodall 1965; for the somewhat different foraging pattern in another 
community, see Kosei 1970]. With the exception of a mother and her in- 
fants, these groups constantly form and reform. At night the chimpanzees 
sleep in trees in these small groups, but from one night to the next the 
group may change greatly in size and composition. 
Several explanations for this loose social structure can be found in the 
literature. One is ecological. Chimpanzees eat a great deal of fruit from 
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trees that grow in small clusters in the forest, too small to provide food 
for more than a limited number. Chimp foraging groups are therefore 
smaller than those of nonhuman primates that eat roots and leaves, found 
in considerable quantity. Another explanation focuses on predation. 
Within the forest or semiforest environment in which the chimpanzees 
live, they need fear few predators; even a solitary chimp is in little danger 
of falling prey to some larger animal. An economic factor might be added. 
Although some economies of scale occur in chimpanzee productive activ- 
ities, as noted below, it does not appear that such activities in large co- 
hesive groups are necessary for survival. Thomas Pitcairn [1974, p. 267] 
notes that such a loose social structure is rare among nonhuman primates. 
The anthropological literature mentions a number of human hunting and 
gathering societies that feature fairly frequent fissioning and fusioning, 
but these processes occur much less often than among chimpanzees; and 
the units involved are usually small family units (and not, as occurs 
among the chimpanzees, single or unrelated individuals). 
At the opposite extreme is the savanna baboon, which may be con- 
sidered the most "collectivistic" of the groups discussed here, using this 
word in a very loose sense also. In most environments these monkeys 
travel together in troops of 30 to 80 members (occasionally numbering 
over 100); forage together as a troop; sleep together in neighboring trees 
(if these are not available, among rocks on a cliff); and fight together for 
mutual protection against predators. Sherwood Washburn and Irven 
DeVore [1963] note that most of a savanna baboon's life is spent within 
a few feet of others in its community, and in relatively rich environments 
this seems to be a good generalization. There is controversy among ob- 
servers about the degree of permeability of these troops by nonmembers. 
One explanation for such a social structure is the environment. The 
savanna baboon is preyed upon by many animals, including lions, leo- 
pards, cheetahs, and chimpanzees. By staying together, baboons are more 
likely to spot these predators. Furthermore, some adult males can help 
protect the females (who are much smaller) and infants while others 
drive away the enemy [Altmann and Altmann 1970]. I have been unable 
to find evidence in the anthropological literature of any human group that 
carries out so many activities together as a large unit. It should be added 
that the savanna baboons exhibit little division of labor, so that each is 
performing roughly the same activities side by side; thus, economies of 
scale in production do not seem to play a causal role in encouraging roup 
activity. 
The hamadryas baboon has the most complicated social structure of 
the species under examination [see, especially, Kummer 1968]. The basic 
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social unit is composed of an adult male, his mates, their infants, and 
some male adolescent hangers-on, designated in the literature as sub- 
dominant peripheral males. Ethologists call this basic group a one-male 
unit or, more picturesquely, a harem. Although the hamadryas pend most 
of their day in these smaller groups, the harems come together in troops 
of about 100 to 200 (sometimes as many as 750) to sleep. In the morning 
they start traveling together in small bands of 20 to 90, a unit that may 
fight with other bands. The troops appear to have an unstable composi- 
tion, fluctuating considerably in size from night to night. A female adult 
hamadryas is very passive and under the coercive tutelage of her mate, 
who enforces his desires by a series of neck bites. In normal circumstances 
they are the only primates considered here who exhibit a fair degree of 
sexual fidelity (pair bonding); the others are sexually promiscuous [Kum- 
mer 1968]. Predation risks for the hamadryas are very much less than for 
the savanna baboons, primarily because they live in environments rela- 
tively inhospitable to predators. 
Several interpretations of the hamadryas social structure have been 
offered. One is that the harem is adaptive for foraging in an arid environ- 
ment. One large male is necessary for protection and insemination, 
whereas several would deprive the small females of food; grouping to- 
gether to sleep is necessary because of the shortage of safe sites. Others 
have explained the banding together at night in terms of a genetic survival 
from the Ur-baboons, who faced environmental conditions similar to 
those still prevailing among savanna baboons. However valid these ex- 
planations, one cannot attribute such group activities to economies of 
scale in production, for these are unimportant. 
The species examined here vary with regard to territorial behavior, 
that is, defense of an exclusive area or range by the troop. It is usually 
argued that territoriality is unimportant for chimpanzees, but in recent 
years one community has been observed to exhibit a form of territoriality. 
Whether this is due to special circumstances or to some general principle 
of chimpanzee social organization is not presently known.4 Among sa- 
vanna baboons, observers have noted certain spacing mechanisms, also 
exhibited somewhat by the hamadryas. These, mechanisms minimize con- 
flicts between troops and are generally considered part of the territoriality 
phenomenon. Primatologists have noted that hamadryas baboons exhibit 
a confidence in claiming sleeping areas which is inversely related to their 
previous use of the site. 
As is discussed below, both chimpanzees and baboons exhibit a cer- 
tain sense of possession toward food. It should be emphasized, however, 
that neither territoriality nor possession of food or other goods [Kummer 
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1973, p. 83; Torii 1975] represents "property" in a significant sense. The 
crucial aspects of property are the procedures of enforcement hat do not 
rely on physical force [see especially Pryor 1973, Appendix A-1], and 
these seem to be missing in the societies of our primate cousins.5 
The social structures of the three groups considered here exhibit dom- 
inance hierarchies, as do those of most nonhuman primates [as surveyed 
by Jolly 1972, pp. 176-85; or Wilson 1975, chapter 13]. In some animal 
species, such as chickens, these hierarchies appear quite simple; the order- 
ing is relatively transitive and stable, and the same hierarchy is manifested 
frequently and obviously in a variety of behaviors. Among the species of 
apes and monkeys under discussion, the dominance relations and me- 
chanisms are quite complicated and subtle. These dominance hierarchies 
can affect the way they approach each other, their agonistic behavior 
(threats and fights), the distribution of food, troop conduct in defense 
against predators, and mating practices. Among chimpanzees, dominance 
relations depend not only upon the type of situation but also upon the 
individuals present [Laweck-Goodall 1975]. Dominance behavior occurs 
among them only rarely and is often difficult o observe; furthermore, even 
transitivity in such relations does not necessarily occur, and the hierarchy 
seems to differ according to circumstance [Reynolds and Reynolds 1965; 
Sugiyama 1973]. Dominance structures are much more evident among 
the baboons. Among savanna baboons, dominant males may defend the 
troop from predators; as is demonstrated below, this aggressive behavior 
has some important consequences for the operation of the economic sys- 
tem.6 A dominance hierarchy does not necessarily exhibit complete tran- 
sitivity, and the literature is not in agreement [Hall and DeVore 1965; 
Hausfater 1975]. Among hamadryas baboons, dominance relations op- 
erate primarily between an adult male and his harem; dominance among 
males is apparent mainly when the band is deciding its direction of travel. 
It should be added that nonhuman primates exhibit distinctive proto- 
cultures (adopting the approach and terminology of [Hallowell 1960]) 
among groups of the same species. The issue has often been debated and 
depends, of course, on one's definition of the term. Assuming that proto- 
culture implies a socialization of the young, some type of communication, 
and a transmission of traditions, a number of observers [Lawick-Goodall 
1973; McGrew 1978, 1977] provide evidence that social learning is con- 
siderable among monkeys and apes. Furthermore, if some entrepreneur 
in the society makes a discovery regarding production or consumption, it 
is often copied by others and transmitted to the next generation. Thus 
some communities of chimpanzees use special tools to collect termites, 
or leaf sponges for obtaining water from tree holes, or consume special 
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kinds of ants, while others do not. Certain baboon troops have special 
techniques for cracking nuts or for eating scorpions and snakes which 
others do not. Other aspects of a proto-culture, such as socialization of 
the young, have received considerable attention from many ethologists. 
Communication between nonhuman primates is the subject of an enor- 
mous literature and cannot be discussed here. Certain more strictly "cul- 
tural" phenomena have also been observed among chimpanzees. It should 
be clear that these proto-cultural or cultural components introduce diffi- 
culties into the analysis of behavior among nonhuman primates; among 
other types of animals, proto-cultural elements appear less important. 
Economic Activities among Nonhuman Primates 
Production 
By production I refer to any activity (whether or not carried out con- 
sciously as production) that a conscientious national income statistician 
might include in the gross forest product of the species. 
Obtaining food and making tools are the main forms of goods produc- 
tion among the primates under consideration. The chimpanzees and sa- 
vanna baboons are omnivorous and may be considered nomadic (in the 
sense of having no permanent sleeping abode in their home range) 
gatherers and hunters. The overwhelming portion of their food (probably 
well over 90 percent) comes from either fruits and other vegetable matter 
or insects, galls, larvae, and so forth, obtained through gathering. The 
hamadryas baboons do not effectively engage in hunting and are solely 
nomadic gatherers. 
These apes and monkeys also produce (perform) and exchange a 
number of important services. Grooming appears the most important 
economically, at least in terms of a portion of their time budget.7 Groom- 
ing is a type of skin care consisting of scratching, removing bugs, and 
cleaning wounds; it also has some social purposes. This service occupies 
several hours a day and should not be considered solely an activity of non- 
human primates; for example, Emanuel Ladurie [1978, chapter 8] has 
noted the daily hours spent in this important activity (especially for pur- 
poses of delousing) in Montaillou, a small French village of the fourteenth 
century. 
Technology. Considerable vidence is available concerning how chim- 
panzees make and use tools [see especially Lawick-Goodall 1970; Teleki 
1974]. They use grass stems to fish termites from their mounds; they also 
strip tree branches and carry them some distance for the same purpose. 
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Chimpanzees chew leaves and use the spongy residue to absorb water in 
tree openings or the remains in brain cases of recently killed game; they 
also use leaves for a variety of other purposes, including bandaging or 
wiping themselves. They use small sticks as toothpicks and rocks to open 
palm nuts. Young chimpanzees observe and learn about these tools and 
techniques from their elders so that a technological tradition is passed 
from generation to generation. Among other things, this means that chim- 
panzee technology varies markedly from one troop to another. Finally, it 
should be noted that chimpanzees sometimes use sticks and stones for 
defensive and offensive purposes [Eaton 1978; Plooij 1978]. 
According to Benjamin Beck [1974], "wild chimpanzees make and 
use tools with far greater frequency than wild baboons." Even when ba- 
boons and chimpanzees live in close contact, baboons do not appear to 
adopt chimpanzee technologies [Teleki 1974]. Some tool usage is re- 
ported; savanna baboons have been observed to use stones to open hard 
fruits and nuts [Jolly 1972, p. 351] and to dissect scorpions in order to 
eat them. They also dig holes on the sides of muddy rivers and drink the 
filtered water [Altmann and Altmann 1970, p. 157], an activity also seen 
among the hamadryas. Tool usage among the hamadryas appears almost 
nonexistent, but this seems traceable to social or perhaps environmental 
factors rather than genetic causes, for tool usage has been reported in one 
case of a captive hamadryas [Beck 1972]. 
Inventing and innovating activities of apes and monkeys have been 
observed. Jane van Lawick-Goodall [1971] has described her difficulties 
in setting up provisioning boxes, for the chimpanzees discovered quite 
easily how to open them and obtain food when they were not supposed 
to. An even more dramatic case occurred among a troop of Japanese 
macaques. One female discovered that the grain tossed on the beach by 
the human observers could be cleansed of sand by throwing everything 
into the water, letting the sand sink, and scraping off the floating grain. 
This technique later was adopted by her children and many other mem- 
bers of the troop [Kummer 1971, p. 122; see also examples in Wilson 
1975, p. 170]. 
In summary, some species of nonhuman primates invent and employ 
new production techniques and tools; they also manufacture these tools 
and, to a certain extent, transport them for use. However, none of the 
nonhuman primates observed have developed techniques for food storage, 
and none of them seem to use tools to make other tools [Lawick-Goodall 
1971, pp. 244-45]. In short, their technology remains at a very low level 
judged by conventional (humanocentric) criteria. 
Production Cooperation and the Division of Labor. A division of labor 
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may not necessarily imply production cooperation, but it is useful to dis- 
cuss these phenomena together. 
Insofar as mutual defense is considered production, considerable divi- 
sion of labor can be observed. Among the savanna baboons, adolescent 
males act as scouts, and adult males serve as the main defense force when 
the troop is attacked. Among the hamadryas, the males protect the fe- 
males. In some chimpanzee communities, males apparently patrol the 
home range boundaries and attack intruders from other communities. 
Although many other examples can be given, it seems most useful to 
focus the discussion of the division of labor and various forms of produc- 
tion cooperation on food production. 
In all three groups under consideration, the primary production (for- 
aging) unit is the single individual, and all but nursing infants forage for 
their own food. This does not mean that production cooperation or 
economies of scale in production are absent, as some have assumed. 
An interesting sexual division of labor has been observed among chim- 
panzees while foraging. Males do most of the predation on mammals, 
while females do more exploitation of insect resources. Also, because 
adult females with infants are considerably less mobile than males travel- 
ing in small groups, the latter tend to forage over a much broader area. If 
they find a tree that is particularly rich in fruit, they may vocalize to 
attract other chimpanzees [according to Wrangham 1977, p. 527, these 
food calls are less frequent in times of food scarcity]. The less mobile 
chimpanzees can take advantage of the work of the more mobile, a feature 
of economic life that suggests certain economies of scale. (The degree of 
intentionality of such verbal messages is unknown but apparently is small; 
indeed, some [Hallowell 1960] have claimed that the only deliberate com- 
munication among nonhuman primates is nonverbal.) A sexual division 
of labor does not seem very important among the savanna or hamadryas 
baboons, who forage in groups [see, however, Rose 1978]. 
Cooperation in foraging and defense has been observed not only be- 
tween members of the same animal species but also between members of 
different species. Eugene Odum [1971, p. 229] has labeled the phenome- 
non mutualism or obligate symbiosis (it may or may not be intentional). 
An important example is reported between savanna baboons and ungu- 
lates, such as impala [Washburn and DeVore 1963, p. 102]. 
In hunting, production cooperation and economies of scale are much 
more manifest. Considerable data have been collected about the chim- 
panzees, which have the most elaborate hunting techniques. According to 
Geza Teleki [1973], chimpanzees use three methods: seizing, chasing, 
and stalking. Seizing is opportunistic behavior (that is, the chimpanzee 
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grabs an animal that is close by) and can be carried out alone. Chasing 
and stalking involve groups of chimpanzees trying to corner their prey 
and require considerable coordination among the hunting team. A num- 
ber of episodes have been recorded [see especially Teleki 1973] that 
testify to the complicated maneuvers. Teleki has noted [1973, p. 173]: 
"Chimpanzee predatory behavior is usually a collective activity that in- 
corporates shared objectives and rewards." Although data collected about 
these episodes suggest that stalking is not particularly effective, group (as 
opposed to individual) chasing has a moderately high success rate and 
provides a nice example of economies of large-scale production. 
Several aspects of this group cooperation should be noted. First, not all 
troops of chimpanzees employ these tactics; Toshisada Nishida [1979] 
studied a troop that used only rudimentary seizure techniques, which sug- 
gests that group hunting is not instinctual but is developed and socially 
learned by the troop. Second, such hunting may not be strictly traceable 
to hunger in a gross sense, for it sometimes occurs after the chimpanzees 
have stuffed themselves with other foods; any meat obtained represents 
luxury consumption unnecessary for survival in any narrow sense. (Given 
the probabilities of obtaining nourishment per calorie of effort expended, 
it may not be "rational" to hunt when one can forage.) Third, coopera- 
tive interaction among chimpanzees has been demonstrated many times in 
laboratory experiments, so cooperation may not be limited to hunting, 
although that is the most dramatic instance. 
Among chimpanzees, coordinated hunting activity is carried on pri- 
marily by adult or adolescent males; females seem to hunt (apparently by 
seizing game) only when males are not present [Teleki 1973, p. 127]. The 
significance of this division of labor by age and sex is difficult to judge; as 
is discussed in detail below, females and infants do receive a share of what 
is obtained by the males, so their direct participation in hunting is not 
necessary to obtain meat. Similar division of labor and subsequent redis- 
tribution of product occur in a number of primitive human societies. 
Hunting among the savanna baboon is more variable than among the 
chimpanzees. In some troops, meat eating is rare, only seizure techniques 
are employed, and only adult males hunt [Altmann and Altmann 1970; 
Washburn and DeVore 1963]. In other troops, meat eating is frequent, 
elaborate techniques such as relay systems are used, and adult males, 
adult females, and male adolescents hunt [Strum 1975]. 
Among the hamadryas, hunting has not been observed. However, this 
monkey is the least studied of the three under discussion, and much needs 
to be learned. 
Production Functions. Although nomadic (in the sense noted above), 
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any given troop of chimpanzees or baboons occupies a relatively small 
range which it "harvests" through foraging activities. Among many 
species of nonhuman primates, there appears to be an observable rela- 
tionship among troop size, richness of environment, and range; elabo- 
rate attempts have been made to propose testable hypotheses about these 
factors [for example, Altmann 1972]. For the species under discussion, 
however, there is considerable debate about the applicability of these 
ideas; so far, the generalizations made on the basis of empirical evidence 
have been rather simple (for example, in relatively poor environments, 
ranges are larger and troop sizes smaller). A more sophisticated approach 
to such questions has been made recently by Teleki [1977], who has at- 
tempted to analyze more carefully the spatial dimensions of chimpanzee 
society in terms of environmental factors and constraints. 
Economic theory might lead us to a number of predictions about for- 
aging strategies (for example, the use of extensive or intensive tech- 
niques). Unfortunately, the literature does not yield sufficient evidence to 
test these ideas, a problem compounded by the fact that (as discussed 
below) the objective function of the animals is unclear. We find only puz- 
zles: Chimpanzees apparently range far in search of high energy foods, 
while purple-faced langurs (Presbytes senex) usually employ the opposite 
strategy and consume low energy foods that can be obtained without 
traveling very far [Hladik 1977]. Many primatologists are aware of this 
deficiency in the literature and are working on such problems. 
Since none of these primates retain tools for any length of time, we can 
make one definite statement about the production function: Capital accu- 
mulation does not influence the long-run level or growth of production. 
Distribution 
By distribution I refer to those activities by means of which goods or 
services are enjoyed by those other than the producer. The various types 
of distribution are defined below strictly in behavioral terms; reciprocity 
refers to a situation in which ape or monkey A gives B some good or ser- 
vice X and receives the same in return; no reference is made to the inten- 
tions of the participants. 
There is evidence that a certain amount of distribution through sharing 
and exchange occurs among chimpanzees in the wild, so that an incipient 
"norm of reciprocity" [as defined by Gouldner 1960] can be observed 
among them. Among the savanna and hamadryas baboons, in contrast, 
distributional activities are less evident for food and apparently less re- 
ciprocal for services. 
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Food. Among chimpanzees, distribution occurs primarily as a result of 
begging (a phenomenon also observed, although perhaps less frequently, 
in other animal species). Teleki [1973, p. 148] has classified four types 
of begging according to degree of success. 
Although the literature focuses on the distribution of meat, distribution 
occurs for vegetable matter as well. W. C. McGrew [1975] provisioned 
chimpanzees with bananas and reports systematic observations of 457 
transfers of bananas and 333 cases of unsuccessful begging. Of the suc- 
cessful transfers, 79 percent of the cases were mothers giving bananas to 
their children, 7 percent were children giving them to their mothers, 10 
percent were adult males giving bananas to adult females, and 4 percent 
were miscellaneous or unspecified. Unfortunately, McGrew does not spec- 
ify what percentage of the transfers were due to begging, taking, spon- 
taneous giving, or other mechanisms. Such transfers are apparently less 
frequent for foods growing in nature, occurring primarily when infants 
and juveniles cannot open fruits with hard shells. 
Chimpanzee distribution with regard to meat has attracted much more 
attention. It occurs less often and in a two-step sequence. The prey first is 
divided into several large hunks within two to four minutes after it is 
killed. Division is made by the chimpanzees who participated in the hunt 
plus others in the immediate vicinity. Any of these chimpanzees (for the 
most part, only males) can start pulling at it; it is, as it were, a public 
good. After this initial flurry of activity, however, the chimpanzees seem 
to recognize as possessors those holding large pieces (or the whole ani- 
mal, if division has not occurred). In chimpanzee communities that do not 
engage in cooperative hunting, no such initial division of the meat that is 
individually caught has been observed [Nishida 1979]. 
The second step is the distribution of small pieces to others. Begging 
occurs, as well as snatching of the fallen food. Possession, not dominance, 
seems crucial at this point, and even more dominant chimpanzees will beg 
from the less dominant rather than take the meat from them. In commu- 
nities where hunting cooperation is not practiced, rights of possession 
have not been observed to operate consistently, and incidents of a domi- 
nant chimpanzee taking the meat from another have been recorded 
[Nishida 1979]. 
Some statistical studies have been made of the receivers and givers of 
meat [see especially Teleki 1973, chapter 3]. Females in estrus are 
most likely to beg for meat from adult males, and their success rate is 
higher. Infants and adolescents beg from their mothers (who have, in 
turn, begged from the adult males); surprisingly (at least to me), their 
success rate is not markedly better than the average. Among the givers 
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of meat, the situation is quite simple: There is a fairly high but by no 
means perfect correlation between dominance and the chimpanzees that 
end up with large chunks after the initial division. The distribution of 
meat does not seem to reflect any strong reciprocity phenomenon (in the 
behavioral meaning given above); rather, dominant adult males usually 
give to those less dominant. 
This transfer of food led Edward 0. Wilson, a leading sociobiologist, 
to declare [1978, p. 151] that chimpanzees are, other than man, the most 
altruistic of all animals. This judgment may be overly enthusiastic. The 
female African hunting dog will carry meat to infants not even her own. 
If the statement is restricted to nonhuman primates, however, there is 
greater agreement among investigators. Primatologists have concluded: 
"Except for man and ... chimpanzees ... primates neither hoard food 
nor share it, except in the sense of allowing others to feed nearby. Even 
mother monkeys do not give up their food to their infants" [Jolly, 1972, 
p. 87]. 
Despite this praise for the chimpanzee, several caveats must be added. 
First, shared food apparently constitutes a very small portion of an aver- 
age chimpanzee's diet. Second, during the provisioning periods when 
many bananas are available, dominant chimpanzees will keep the others 
from eating until they have had their fill. Finally, when they eat together, 
chimpanzees take food from baboons upon occasion, behavior that is not 
reciprocated, perhaps because the baboons are considerably smaller 
[Morris and Goodall 1977]. 
Neither the savanna nor the hamadryas baboon engages in food shar- 
ing through begging to any degree. Kummer [1968] reports that more 
dominant males sometimes displace less dominant ones from feeding 
grounds or eat grass plants that the latter have dug up; such displacement 
activities by baboons are difficult to observe because they require close 
attention to subtle movements. A number of observers report that male 
baboons take food from females or that mothers occasionally take food 
from their children, a behavior apparently rare among chimpanzees. If 
a savanna baboon obtains a small animal, others hover like vultures, 
waiting for pieces to fall or for the eater to become sated and leave the 
meat. 
Among the hamadryas baboon neither food sharing nor food taking 
appears to occur. However, much remains to be learned. 
Services. As noted above, nonhuman primates exchange numerous 
types of services, among which grooming occupies the most time for the 
species under discussion [time budget data for chimpanzees are found 
in Teleki 1977]. Since grooming can be provided by all but the youngest 
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infants, it seems useful to inquire about the reciprocal supply of services. 
M. J. A. Simpson [1973, p. 434] shows that only about 25 percent of 
the average grooming sessions among adult male chimpanzees feature 
mutual grooming. He does show [p. 446] that, over time, the amount of 
grooming a particular male performs on any given partner roughly 
equals the grooming he receives. Data from Jane Goodall [1965, p. 469] 
reveal that among major social groups of adult chimpanzees (males, fe- 
males in estrus, and other females) grooming accounts are roughly bal- 
anced. However, female adults groom infants and juveniles more than 
the reverse. A study of grooming behavior of chimpanzees in a zoo colony 
[Okono et al. 1973, pp. 94-95] showed that for every 100 grooming epi- 
sodes (either grooming or being groomed), an average chimpanzee is 
likely to have an imbalance in its grooming account of about 23 (that is, 
it will be groomed 38.5 times and will groom 61.5 times, or vice versa).8 
Although all these data are not comparable, my impression is that groom- 
ing reciprocity in the zoo is somewhat less balanced than in the wild. 
The significance of these exchange data for the overall chimpanzee 
economic system can best be seen by comparing them to similar data for 
primitive human economies. Unfortunately, data for humans are very 
difficult to find, but in one economy, an Eskimo village with a strong 
ideological emphasis on reciprocity of exchange [Pryor 1977, chapter 4], 
similar calculations, for visiting and food sharing among adults, have 
been made. In comparison with the Eskimo (and employing a slightly 
different measure of nonreciprocity), the chimpanzees reveal greater re- 
ciprocity! Important nonreciprocities among the Eskimo are structured 
according to groups (for example, women are givers, men are receivers; 
married people are givers, unmarrieds are receivers; and so forth). Struc- 
turing in chimpanzee troops according to relatively formal subgroups 
does not seem very strong, so that this source of nonreciprocity does not 
arise. 
Much less statistical evidence is available regarding grooming networks 
among savanna and hamadryas baboons. Qualitative evidence from the 
literature suggests that grooming reciprocity is much less balanced among 
the chimpanzees and that this nonreciprocity is highly structured. Among 
the savanna baboons, dominant males receive much more grooming than 
they give, especially from the females [Washburn and DeVore 1963; 
Washburn and Hamburg 1968, p. 471]. However, a female baboon is 
more likely to be groomed by a male if she is in estrus [Hall and DeVore 
1965]. Among the hamadryas, most grooming occurs within the harem 
between the adult male and his mates; males seem to receive considerably 
more grooming than they give. Only very old or very young hamadryas 
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groom one another. It also seems that female mates of the same male do 
not groom one another very often. Hans Kummer [1968, pp. 44-45] re- 
ports that if a female is in estrus or if the number of females in the harem 
has declined, the adult male does a great deal more grooming than in 
ordinary circumstances. 
Consumption 
Chimpanzees and baboons spend almost all their time in foraging; food 
obtained from the dramatic kinds of hunting episodes discussed above 
represents a very small portion of their diet. This is not surprising, for 
most human hunting and gathering societies have found that food ob- 
tained from gathering is, relative to the effort involved, more productive 
and safer. Most of those societies obtain most of their nourishment from 
gathering [Lee 1968], and the reason apes and monkeys forage so much 
is undoubtedly the same. 
The important role played by ecology in determining the types of foods 
consumed is shown by the considerable overlap in the lists of foods 
eaten by nonhuman primates and their human neighbors [Teleki 1975]. 
It should be noted, however, that neither group consumes all the available 
foods. McGrew [1977] presents evidence from experiment and observa- 
tion in the wild that food habits among chimpanzees are relatively con- 
servative; they do not readily eat new foods. Furthermore, foods con- 
sumed by different communities of chimpanzees in apparently similar 
ecological milieus vary, which suggests either that proto-cultural elements 
play a role or that the ecological factors are more subtle than have yet 
been discerned. 
How important is this proto-cultural element in food selection? To 
answer this question we might investigate the nutrient value of the various 
foods, find out the minimum nutrient needs of these species, determine 
the relative scarcity of the various foods (which would represent a scarcity 
price of the foods), apply the standard linear programming techniques to 
solve the diet problem, and then compare the results with actual foods 
selected. Information about nutrient values is already available [for ex- 
ample, Hladek 1977], and other necessary data undoubtedly have been 
collected but not published. Short of an elaborate analysis, however, we 
can only rely on qualitative remarks by various primatologists, such as 
Hladek's observation [p. 500] that many foods selected have no obvious 
effect on nutrition. 
Foraging in a group has certain disadvantages if the desired food grows 
in scattered patches. However, group foraging reduces the time each in- 
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dividual spends in defense or vigilence and so may increase the time 
available for searching for food. 
Some Perspectives 
The materials presented above can be analyzed from a number of 
varied viewpoints. For economists, three issues seem particularly impor- 
tant: the degree to which these primate species may be considered rational 
decision makers; the forces influencing their distribution of income; and 
the paths which led from their economies to ours. 
On Economic Primate 
Rationality, in a narrow sense, refers to choice. Nonhuman primates 
can be said to exhibit rationality or act economically if some of our 
models of rational choice can be applied to behavior of theirs that seems 
attributable to deliberate decision making. Of course, one must deter- 
mine the degree to which they make deliberate decisions, in contrast to 
acting either instinctually or according to their proto-culturally learned 
patterns. Once a determination is made, one need not pay attention to 
their detailed reasoning processes, but may focus on their behavior. 
Innovative behavior, by definition, involves deliberate decision making. 
Several examples have been presented above, and Melvin Fredlund [1975] 
has collected a number of others. But, unfortunately, available decision- 
making models do not apply to such creative behavior. 
If we turn to other types of activities, a number of apparently rational 
nonhuman primate behaviors can be classified according to trade-offs. 
One is the labor-leisure trade-off. Stuart Altmann and Jeanne Altmann 
[1970, p. 90] have found that baboons sleep later in the morning when 
they are in richer gathering grounds (which they interpret to represent 
decision, rather than digestion). Another is the risk-production trade- 
off. The Altmanns present detailed evidence on baboons' geographical 
movements that shows they spend time in rich areas and avoid locales 
that do not yield much food or water; they frequent safe sites and avoid 
or spend little time in dangerous areas or activities; and they spend a 
moderate amount of time in rich but dangerous areas. Trade-offs also are 
made between different foods. Chimpanzees do not stuff themselves on 
the fruit of any given tree, but eat part of the fruits of one tree, move 
on to a different kind of tree, and return to the first tree another day 
[Reynolds 1965, pp. 162-63]. In terms of a production-consumption 
trade-off, chimpanzees have been observed cutting back on their gath- 
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ering activities when it is raining and uncomfortable to forage. Fredlund 
[1975] has collected a variety of material which illustrates the marginal 
principles that form the core of neoclassical economics. 
The problem with this approach is that it does not tell us very much. 
In the cases mentioned, it seems that the nonhuman primates are en- 
gaged in making choices and that the results of their deliberations can be 
explained by models of rational decision making (if we impute a particular 
kind of utility function to them), but the imputation can be made only in 
certain special cases. To illustrate, two counter-examples to those given 
above will be presented. 
Teleki [1973, p.57] noted that savanna baboons at the Gombe Na- 
tional Park would visit the feeding stations for the chimpanzees to ob- 
tain bananas, and in one year the chimpanzees killed 7 percent of one 
baboon troop and 9 percent of another. Nevertheless, the baboons con- 
tinued to come; indeed, they even remained when the chimpanzees were 
busy eating one of their troop members [p. 153]. It may be that the 
utility of gaining bananas was considerably higher than the disutility 
of a 7-9 percent chance of being killed; or that information costs were 
sufficiently high that the baboons did not know the odds; or that the adults 
who made the decision to visit the feeding station were not the ones to be 
eaten (only infants suffered this fate). However, interpretations uch as 
these fly in the face of evidence from Altmann and Altman [1970] and 
many other studies that savanna baboons are very sensitive to predation; 
after a predator kills a member of the troop, the baboons generally avoid 
the site for some time. Similarly, although there may be a certain utility 
to consumption variety, there are cases on record of both chimpanzees 
and baboons gorging themselves on the fruit of one tree the entire day. 
In this case a dedicated utility theorist would certainly argue that the 
utility of variety was less than the utility of the particular fruit, but this 
only tells us what we already know-the primates stayed by a single tree 
that day. 
The problem is also illustrated in an interesting debate about the rea- 
sons (or the specification of the utility function) underlying predation 
activities among nonhuman primates. Various analysts have made refer- 
ence to food crazes, troop traditions, pest-control of species competing 
for the same foods, complementary nutritional needs (to vegetable foods), 
environmental change, the desire to minimize energy expended per unit 
of energy obtained, and so forth. In the course of this heated debate, 
Strum [1976, p. 316] makes an interesting observation: "Most ecologists 
agree that optimization is likely a real phenomenon; few agree on just 
how it operates or at what level (the individual, population, or species). If 
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at the individual level, is it simply energy maximization or does it involve 
nutrient complementarity, use of time, fitness strategies involving intra- 
specific interference, and so forth? Optimization at higher levels, involving 
coevolution, interspecies interference, competition, or group selection 
may work against individual optimization, for example, making predators 
responsible (prudent) in their energy acquisition." 
This debate reveals several methodological dangers. First, we should 
avoid conflating maximization with certain biological concepts. That is, 
Darwin did not speak of survival of the maximizers, but of the fittest; and 
it seems useful to separate short-run maximization from long-run survival. 
Second, until we have some better notion of the utility function of non- 
human primates (a matter in which revealed preference techniques might 
be applied), we must be cautious in our use of such concepts as function, 
adaptation, or utility maximization for primates. The analogues be- 
tween this kind of methodological problem and, let us say, that arising 
in the analysis of enterprise behavior (at least some economists are un- 
clear about whether maximization is occurring and what is being maxi- 
mized) should be readily apparent. 
Rationality, in a broader sense, refers to situations in which certain 
behavior contributes positively to some goal (implicit or explicit) of the 
society, such as its survival; but it is often unclear whether a deliberate 
decision is being made. For example, given the predator problem among 
the baboons, it seems rational for them to stay together for mutual de- 
fense. But two problems arise with this kind of analysis. First, it usually 
neglects the negative aspects of the behavior, for example, a large troop 
may not be able to find as much food for each individual as can monkeys 
foraging in smaller groups. Second, such arguments assume that it is 
possible to impute utility to certain "functions," but except for the survival 
case, this is very difficult to do in a convincing fashion without running 
severe risks of tautological argumentation. 
Another illustration can be taken from Fredlund's [1975] analysis of 
the division of the hunting prey. He argues that the public good property 
of the prey during the first few minutes after it is killed is rational because 
it provides potential rewards for all participants in the cooperative ven- 
ture. However, the baboons sometimes engage in violent free-for-alls, and 
some may be killed (which is dysfunctional, unless only the unfit perish). 
Furthermore, if the nonhuman primate participates in chase activities for 
sport, "property incentives" are unnecessary. Thus, designating the short 
period after the kill when the meat has no formal possessor as a rational 
public goods institution requires the imputation of motives about other 
aspects of the hunting process for which we have no information. 
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I am not trying to deny the usefulness of the utility maximization model. 
But applying it as an ex post explanation for various aspects of chimpanzee 
and baboon life may obscure, rather than illuminate, the casual forces that 
may be involved in bringing about adaptive behavior on any level. 
On Exploitation and the 
Distribution of Income 
For exploitation I do not use the Marxian meaning that stems from the 
ownership of the means of production and the extraction of surplus 
value; I use the neo-Marxist meaning of "unequal exchange." The dis- 
tribution of income (more specifically, differences in consumption levels) 
can be influenced by both the distribution of production and by unequal 
exchange. 
The distribution of production in any foraging economy is affected by 
the ability of the gatherer to cover a wide area. Among chimpanzees, the 
necessary vigor to do so may be reinforced by the extra food obtained 
(as long as the marginal unit of energy expended is less than the energy 
obtained). Since physical vigor is also positively related to dominance, 
which is related to obtaining meat during its initial division, the more 
dominant chimpanzees produce more and are in a position to consume 
more. Among baboons, which forage in groups, such differential pro- 
duction is probably less important. 
In the context of the economies under study, equal exchange is illus- 
trated by the reciprocal exchange of services among chimpanzees. The 
watchword seems to be: "Scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." We 
can approach the question of exploitation more systematically by re- 
viewing the various types of unequal exchange, and an obvious threefold 
classification suggests itself. 
The first type may be designated "altruistic transfers" (in this phrase, 
altruism refers to behavior, not motive) and consists of the producer 
giving food to those who did not participate in its production. This be- 
havior, which occurs only among the chimpanzees, is a process by which 
the distribution of income is made more equal, since the possessors of 
such food generally have a higher consumption level. 
The second type of unequal exchange is the taking of food from the 
producer. This is usually carried out by the dominant over the less 
dominant and represents a regressive transfer since the dominants have 
a higher real income in terms of consumption of goods and services. This 
malevolent ransfer does not seem to occur often among the chimpanzees, 
except in rare circumstances when dominance hierarchies become especi- 
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ally important (for example, zoo settings or artificial provisioning). 
Among savanna baboons, these unequal exchanges occur somewhat more 
often, as when males take food from females or less dominant baboons 
are displaced from feeding grounds. However, one receives the impres- 
sion that only a minuscule percentage of total food consumed is involved, 
especially in contrast to human gatherers and hunters [some quantitative 
evidence is available in Pryor, 1977]. Among the hamadryas, malevolent 
transfers of food seem extremely unimportant. 
The third type of unequal exchange is represented by grooming services 
that are not fully reciprocated (in a behavioral sense). This also seems 
to be a regressive transfer since the dominant primates usually receive and 
the nondominant give. (The nondominant may groom the dominant in 
order to receive protection later.) This situation occurs primarily among 
savanna and hamadryas baboons, especially with regard to the grooming 
of males by females. Such exploitation based on sex is not unknown among 
humans; in Montaillou, the fourteenth-century French village referred 
to earlier, adult men were much more often deloused by adult women 
than vice versa [Ladurie 1978, chapter 8]. 
In human societies with very low levels of economic development, the 
leaders of the group often are net food givers to the others; indeed, this 
is a means of establishing their leadership [Pryor 1977, chapter 10]. It 
is only in economically more developed societies that dominance is re- 
flected in greater receiving than giving. In this respect, the chimpanzees 
are similar to the most primitive human societies, while the savanna and 
hamadryas baboons are more similar to advanced human societies. Such 
a paradoxical result suggests some of the dangers of making evolutionary 
inferences from current data on different species of nonhuman primates. 
Further complications in the analogy arise when other primates, such as 
rhesus monkeys, are considered. In some cases of experimentally induced 
famine, the dominant rhesus monkeys will take food from the less dom- 
inant (which become lethargic); through this mechanism, the "best" 
genes are preserved. 
The fact that dominance is reflected in nonequivalent exchange of a 
regressive type is not necessarily maladaptive, no matter how abhorrent 
it may be on an ethical level. Among the savanna baboons, the dominance 
hierarchy also yields an important defense function which benefits all of 
the less aggressive. The hamadryas male also plays a similar protective role 
for the females in his harem, although the need for protection appears 
considerably less than for the savanna baboon. To draw a human analogy, 
in wartime we often feel generals may be obnoxious and greedy, as long 
as they are successful; indeed, in extreme situations, only the most ag- 
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gressive and unpleasant people make the best generals. (It should be 
added that counter-examples can also be given.) 
Dominance can appear in situations in which it does not seem to have 
any important relation to survival or any other positive function of the 
society, for example, in provisioning situations or in zoos. In these cases, 
the unequal exchange engendered by dominance is more difficult to 
justify. The extreme plasticity of the chimpanzees regarding exploitation 
(benevolent transfers and reciprocal exchange in one type of situation; 
dominance and unequal exchange in others) is a behavior pattern whose 
strands have not yet been completely separated, a puzzle upon which to 
end our meditation on this subject. 
On Long-Term Economic Change 
Even the most primitive human hunting and gathering societies feature 
considerably more complicated social structures, more developed di- 
visions of labor, and more extensive cooperation at different levels than 
those of the nonhuman primates under discussion. Human societies have 
much more sophisticated production technologies. This is especially true 
for hunting; humans have devised various kinds of traps, weapons, and 
stalking techniques, observed only in the most rudimentary form among 
our primate cousins. Food preparation technologies, especially cooking, 
are considerably more advanced among humans. Interestingly, food stor- 
age techniques are almost nonexistent among some human societies living 
in environments imilar to those of the monkeys and apes, so differences 
do not appear as striking along this dimension. Humans do seem willing 
to abstain from eating certain food that has been gathered so as to provide 
a small-but perishable-emergency stock. Apes and monkeys appar- 
ently do not do this, although occasionally chimpanzees eat only part of 
the fruit in a tree and return another day to finish it, and they sometimes 
carry meat around for several hours, rather than consume it on the spot 
(perhaps because they have no safe place to store it). 
In the sphere of distribution, statistical analysis by Pryor [1977] has 
shown that three types of exchange and transfer (modes of distribution) 
exist in human hunting and gathering societies. Each type accounts for 
distribution of about 5 percent or more of goods and services produced 
in the economy: the reciprocal exchange of goods; the reciprocal exchange 
of services; and (benevolent) transfers of goods. Neither chimpanzee nor 
baboon economies appear to feature the first type. Although the second 
and third modes occur in chimpanzee economies, the magnitude of the 
transfer of goods seems to be very much smaller than in the human socie- 
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ties. Baboon society mainly features the reciprocal exchange of services, 
although baboons also transfer services (nonreciprocated grooming), a 
mode of distribution which usually occurs in human societies only at 
considerably higher levels of economic development. 
All in all, it appears that the differences in human gathering and hunt- 
ing economies and the economies of the nonhuman primates under con- 
sideration lie more in the sphere of distribution (exchanges and transfers) 
than in production (gathering and hunting). Unfortunately, distribution 
in primate societies has been studied less intensively than production, and 
many years of patient, difficult, and uncomfortable fieldwork by primatol- 
ogists is necessary before judgments on such matters can be made with 
more certainty. 
The big puzzle is the path of evolution over the last few million years. 
Here, two serious methodological problems arise. First, we cannot de- 
duce very much about dynamics from the comparative statics analysis 
that has been performed, a problem well known in economics. Second, 
the similarity of certain economic features does not connote evolutionary 
closeness. For example, in an interesting comparative analysis of the so- 
cieties of a large number of carnivores and of nonhuman primates, Philip 
Thompson [1975] shows that the former are more similar to humans 
along a number of dimensions than are the latter (in terms of food storage, 
division of labor, killing more game than is needed to eat, food sharing, 
and so forth). Since the carnivores studied are considerably more distant 
from humans in intelligence and anatomy than the nonhuman primates, 
the lesson from such a comparison (even though some details can be 
disputed) should be taken seriously. 
Given these methodological difficulties-and others-it should come 
as no surprise that disagreements among biologists about the path of 
evolution from the Ur-primate to humankind are intense. Furthermore, 
some of the mechanisms that promote survival of a species may relate 
to dominance and strength, while others may relate to cooperation. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to specify which of those mechanisms played 
an important evolutionary role when humans and nonhuman primates 
split in their evolutionary development. 
Concluding Remarks 
Much about the economic life of chimpanzees and baboons remains 
unknown. Certainly, the Chicago School economist would wish to know 
more about information and transaction costs; the Marxist, more about 
dominance and exploitation; the production theorist, more about the 
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ecological conditions defining the production function; and all of us, more 
about exchange and transfer. We are many decades from being able to 
construct convincing mathematical models of these economic systems 
in the manner that, for example, Wilson [1975, chapter 14] has done for 
social roles in an ant colony. 
What use are studies of nonhumans for economists? On the most im- 
mediate level, some may illuminate facets of human gathering and hunt- 
ing societies, particularly their ecological adaption [for example, Teleki 
1975]. Such investigations also may help us answer a more basic question 
of a different order: Who are we, and from whence have we come? But 
we need other kinds of knowledge to answer another question: Where 
are we going, and what are we to become? 
Notes 
1. Such hoarding and seizing behavior among chimpanzees has been ob- 
served only in very attenuated form in the field. Designating the taking 
of money tokens as "stealing" is incorrect, since it implies a sense of 
property which may not be present. These laboratory experiments have 
been described by John Wolfe [1936] and have been observed in a va- 
riety of other experiments ince then. 
2. Evidence for chimpanzees is described by Jane van Lawick-Goodall 
[1971] and Geza Teleki [1973]; for savanna baboons, see Ueli Nagel 
[1974, p. 173]; and for hamadryas, see Hans Kummer [1968, p. 6]. This 
phenomenon receives various contradictory interpretations. 
3. Coordinated subgroup activities include patrolling and hunting. Con- 
cerning the entire group, there is considerable controversy [see Pitcairn 
1974] about the exact social role of the chimpanzee community and 
whether the community is a social unit. Those arguing the affirmative 
include Goodall [1979] and Teleki [1977]; those holding opposite views 
include Vernon Reynolds and Frances Reynolds [1965]. 
4. In the early 1970s the allegedly gentle troop at the Gombe National Park 
split into two groups. Sometime thereafter the larger group began to 
attack the smaller, and eventually the smaller community was effectively 
decimated [Goodall 1979]. Interpretations of this phenomenon vary 
considerably. 
5. Although territoriality is not equivalent to a sense of property in the 
strict sense, some of the economic analysis concerning property can be 
applied to it; see the interesting article by Melvin Fredlund [1976]. Dis- 
cussions about animals' territorial imperative provide dubious explana- 
tions for human behavior until it can be demonstrated that the meaning 
of such activity is interpreted similarly by the various groups being com- 
pared. Otherwise, the comparisons are merely a behavioral parallel upon 
which to meditate. 
6. The link between external defense and internal dominance behavior in 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Wed, 29 Apr 2015 13:39:01 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
56 Frederic L. Pryor 
the group is, of course, aggressive activity; thus, this complex of external 
and internal behaviors exhibits a consistency that has impressed many 
observers. Parallels with human societies usually leave something to be 
desired in the way of rigor or meaningfulness. 
7. A number of serious conceptual difficulties arise in defining services in 
economic terms, some of which have been explored [Neale 1964; Pryor 
1977, pp. 26-27]. Although I am not sure that social grooming would fit 
into the definition proposed by either of these sources, this activity oc- 
cupies roughly 19 percent of the waking hours of the chimpanzees at 
Gombe and considerable amounts of the baboons' time. Without worry- 
ing about a precise definition of service, I stretch the concept in this essay 
to include grooming. 
8. These data are for the grooming accounts for individuals in the aggre- 
gate; greater imbalances appear between individual pairs of chimpanzees. 
When grooming is scored according to quality (length of time, and so 
forth), the accounts are somewhat more unequal. 
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